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PARTNERSHIP DERIVATIVE SUITS: JENNINGS V. KAY
JENNINGS FAMILY LTD. PARTNERSHIP
Patricia Collins McCullagh *
I. INTRODUCTION
In Jennings v. Kay Jennings Family Ltd. Partnership, a case of
first impression, the Supreme Court of Virginia established the
criteria for determining when a limited partner "fairly and ade-
quately represent[s] the interests" of other limited partners and a
partnership for purposes of properly bringing a derivative action
pursuant to Virginia Code section 50-73.62.1 Section 50-73.62 al-
lows a limited partner to stand in the shoes of a limited partner-
ship to seek recovery for damage to the partnership, as compared
to bringing a direct claim for individual harm or damage caused
to the limited partner himself.2 Although a derivative claim can
be brought against a third party, limited partners often bring
such actions against the general partner(s) for alleged wrong-
doing that has caused harm to the limited partnership or its val-
ue.
The holdings and determinations in Jennings may have a sig-
nificant impact on the ability of limited partners-especially
those who are economically antagonistic to the partnership-to
seek redress for the wrongful acts of the general partner(s). Part
II of this article discusses current Virginia law regarding deriva-
tive actions, including when a limited partner must bring a de-
rivative action as opposed to a direct action. Part III explores the
Jennings decision and the impact this decision may have on a li-
mited partner's ability to seek redress, whether derivatively or
directly, under current Virginia law. Finally, Part IV outlines
some of the potential options a limited partner may have to ad-
* Partner, McCandlish Holton, P.C., Richmond, Virginia. J.D., 1997, University of
Richmond School of Law; B.S., 1994, Fairfield University.
1. 275 Va. 594, 600-02, 659 S.E.2d 283, 287-88 (2008).
2. See VA. CODE ANN. § 50-73.62 (Repl. Vol. 2009).
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dress alleged wrongful acts of the general partner(s) in the wake
of the Jennings decision.
II. VIRGINIA LAW ON DERIVATIVE ACTIONS
A. Distinction Between Derivative and Direct Claims
In Virginia, derivative claims are statutorily created.3 Thus,
the Virginia Code and relevant case law set forth the require-
ments and process for bringing such actions. The derivative ac-
tions provision of Virginia's Revised Uniform Limited Partnership
Act ("Limited Partnership Act") provides that "[a] limited partner
may bring an action in the right of a limited partnership to recov-
er a judgment in its favor to the same extent that a stockholder
may bring an action for a derivative suit under the Stock Corpora-
tion Act. ' 4 Accordingly, the principles that apply to shareholder
derivative suits also apply to derivative claims brought by limited
partners.5 The Limited Partnership Act further provides that
[sluch action may be brought if general partners with authority to do
so have refused to bring the action or if an effort to cause those gen-
eral partners to bring the action is not likely to succeed. The deriva-
tive action may not be maintained if it appears that the plaintiff does
not fairly and adequately represent the interests of the limited part-
ners and the partnership in enforcing the right of the partnership.6
The Limited Partnership Act also provides for the award of at-
torney's fees in certain situations:
If a derivative action is successful, in whole or in part, or if anything
is received by the plaintiff as a result of a judgment, compromise or
settlement of an action or claim, except as hereinafter provided, the
court may award the plaintiff reasonable expenses, including rea-
sonable attorney's fees, and shall direct him to remit to the limited
partnership the remainder of those proceeds received by him. On
termination of the derivative action, the court may require the plain-
tiff to pay any defendant's reasonable expenses, including reasonable
3. See, e.g., Virginia Stock Corporation Act, VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-672.1 to 13.1-
672.6 (Repl. Vol. 2006 & Cum. Supp. 2009).
4. Id. § 50-73.62 (Repl. Vol. 2009) (emphasis added).
5. See id.; see also Little v. Cooke, 274 Va. 697, 710, 652 S.E.2d 129, 137 (2007) (cit-
ing Strain v. Seven Hills Assocs., 429 N.Y.S.2d 424, 432 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980) ("[A] limited
partner's power to vindicate a wrong done to the limited partnership and to enforce re-
dress for the loss or diminution in value of his interest is no greater than that of a stock-
holder of a corporation.")).
6. VA. CODE ANN. § 50-73.62 (Repl. Vol. 2009) (emphasis added).
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attorney's fees, incurred in defending the action if it finds that the
action was commenced without reasonable cause or the plaintiff did
not fairly and adequately represent the interests of the limited part-
ners and the partnership in enforcing the right of the partnership.'
Although neither the Limited Partnership Act nor the Stock
Corporation Act defines exactly what is and what is not a deriva-
tive claim," a review of relevant case law and other background
sources provides the guidance necessary to determine when an
action may be brought directly and when it must be filed deriva-
tively. A direct claim exists when the injury is suffered by the
plaintiff individually as either a shareholder or limited partner,
and not by the corporation, such as "where the action is based on
a contract to which the [plaintiff] is a party, or on a right belong-
ing severally to the [plaintiff], or on a fraud affecting the [plain-
tiff] directly."9 Conversely, a derivative claim exists when the en-
tire body of shareholders or limited partners is injured by the
actions or omitted actions for which a complaint has been submit-
ted. 10 Therefore, derivative claims are ones that belong to the li-
mited partnership rather than the individual limited partner.
Two cases from the Supreme Court of Virginia, Simmons v.
Miller" and, more recently, Little v. Cooke, 2 are particularly in-
structive on the distinction between derivative and direct claims
in Virginia. Simmons involved a direct claim against the officer
and director of a closely held corporation. 3 The minority share-
holder, Simmons, alleged that Miller, the majority shareholder
and sole officer and director, breached her fiduciary duty by
usurping corporate opportunities for her own individual benefit.' 4
Simmons appealed the trial court's ruling that he could not main-
tain a direct claim for breach of fiduciary duty against Miller and
that he must bring such a claim derivatively on behalf of the cor-
poration.15 In affirming the trial court's decision and determining
7. Id. § 50-73.65 (Repl. Vol. 2009). The remaining portions of the Limited Partner-
ship Act involving derivative actions are not directly relevant to this article.
8. See id. §§ 50-73.62 to 50-73.65 (Repl. Vol. 2009); id. §§ 13.1-672.1 to 13.1-672.6
(Repl. Vol. 2006 & Cum. Supp. 2009).
9. 12B WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER ET AL., FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF
CORPORATIONS § 5911 (perm. ed., rev. vol. 2009) (footnotes omitted).
10. Id.
11. 261 Va. 561, 544 S.E.2d 666 (2001).
12. 274 Va. 697, 652 S.E.2d 129 (2007).
13. Simmons, 261 Va. at 565, 544 S.E.2d at 669.
14. Id. at 566, 570, 544 S.E.2d at 669-70, 672.
15. Id. at 571-72, 544 S.E.2d at 673.
2009]
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that the harm alleged was to the corporation and not to Simmons
individually, the supreme court stated that "[tihe overwhelming
majority rule is that an action for injuries to a corporation cannot
be maintained by a shareholder on an individual basis and must
be brought derivatively. ''16 The court declined to adopt an excep-
tion to this majority rule that would allow for direct claims to be
brought when the entity involved is a closely held corporation,
reasoning that the majority rule was preferable because it (1)
prevented a multiplicity of lawsuits by shareholders, (2) protected
creditors by returning erroneously removed assets or proceeds
back into the corporation, and (3) promoted predictability and
protected the interests of all shareholders. 7
Little essentially affirmed the holdings of Simmons and direct-
ly applied them to limited partnership derivative actions.18 In Lit-
tle, the supreme court appeared to agree that the limited partners
properly filed the action as a derivative claim, but determined
that certain tax damages awarded to the limited partners indivi-
dually were not appropriate.' 9 The court reasoned that a deriva-
tive action could only recover damages incurred by the partner-
ship, and in this situation, the partnership itself suffered no tax
consequences as a result of the defendant's actions. 20 As it did in
Simmons, the supreme court looked to the harm caused to the
partners individually and the harm caused to the limited part-
nership as a whole to determine what was properly covered by a
derivative versus a direct action.21
Accordingly, in Virginia, to determine whether a limited part-
ner may file a direct claim against the general partner(s) or
whether the action must be filed derivatively, it is necessary to
evaluate the nature of the alleged damage. If the harm impacts
16. Id. at 573, 544 S.E.2d at 674.
17. See id. at 576, 544 S.E.2d at 675. The court further opined that "[dierivative suits
play an 'important role in protecting shareholders of corporations from the designing
schemes and wiles of insiders who are willing to betray their company's interest in order
to enrich themselves.'" Id. at 573, 544 S.E.2d at 674 (quoting Surowitz v. Hilton Hotels
Corp., 383 U.S. 363, 371 (1966)).
18. See Little v. Cooke, 274 Va. 697, 709-10, 652 S.E.2d 129, 136-37 (2007).
19. See id. at 712, 652 S.E.2d at 138.
20. See id; see also Golden Tee, Inc. v. Venture Golf Schs., Inc., 969 S.W.2d 625, 628-
29 (Ark. 1998) (stating that a derivative claim was the appropriate action for a limited
partner to bring where the alleged harm was "individual" indirect damage based on a de-
crease in value of the partnership).
21. Little, 274 Va. at 710-12, 652 S.E.2d at 137-38.
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the partnership generally, then the action is derivative and the
plaintiff can recover damages incurred by the partnership and re-
turn those monies to the partnership.22 However, if it is shown
that the limited partner suffered an individual harm separate
and apart from the partnership or other limited partners, then
the limited partner may bring a direct claim against the general
partner(s) for breach of fiduciary duty, breach of the partnership
agreement, fraud, or similar claims.23 Thus, when the harm
caused is truly to the partnership and not the individual part-
ners, a limited partner may unly assert a derivative claim to chal-
lenge the actions of the general partner(s) and then must meet
the specific requirements of the Limited Partnership Act's deriva-
tive provisions in order to bring and maintain such a suit.
B. Requirements of a Derivative Action
The Limited Partnership Act requires the limited partner to
have certain characteristics and take certain procedural steps
prior to filing a derivative action. To meet the characteristics re-
quirement, the limited partner must (1) have been a partner--or
possessed the rights of a partner-at the time the claim arose and
at the commencement of the action and (2) "fairly and adequately
represent the interests of the limited partners and the partner-
ship in enforcing the right of the partnership." 24 Procedurally, the
limited partner must show that the general partner(s) have failed
to act upon the request of the limited partner or, if the partner
has not made the request, that such request would be unheeded. 21
Therefore, in the complaint the limited partner must plead with
particularity the efforts taken to induce the general partner(s) to
bring such an action or the reasons for not making such an effort
or request.26 Inherently, the limited partner should also plead
that he was a partner at the appropriate times and that he "fairly
22. See, e.g., id. at 710, 652 S.E.2d at 137.
23. See FLETCHER ET AL., supra note 9.
24. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 50-73.62 to 50-73.63 (Repl. Vol. 2009).
25. Id. § 50-73.62 (Repl. Vol. 2009).
26. Id. § 50-73.64 (Repl. Vol. 2009). Also, as the Limited Partnership Act authorizes a
limited partner to bring an action "to the same extent" as a shareholder in a derivative
action, a limited partner plaintiff would be wise to make his demand for action on the gen-
eral partners in writing unless he intends to show that such a demand would go unad-
dressed. See id. § 13.1-672.1(B)(1) (Repl. Vol. 2009).
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and adequately" represents the partnership or limited partners
for the pleading to survive a demurrer."
Although most of these requirements were easy to comprehend
and satisfy procedurally, neither the Virginia Code nor any Vir-
ginia court provided guidance as to what a limited partner must
show in order to meet the "fairly and adequately represent" stan-
dard prior to the supreme court's decision in Jennings.
III. JENNINGS' ANALYSIS OF THE "FAIRLY AND ADEQUATELY
REPRESENTING" STANDARD
A. Case Summary
Jennings involved a limited partnership, the Kay Jennings
Family Limited Partnership (the "Partnership"), in which siblings
Katherine, Louis, and Beverly Jennings each held a 5% general
partnership interest and a 15% limited partnership interest,
while another sibling, Michael, held a 40% limited partnership
interest.28 The Partnership was a tenant on property owned by
Avis and Mary Boothe in Springfield, Virginia (the "Property").29
Michael, through DAMN, LLC-an entity he controlled-
ultimately purchased the Property and became the Partnership's
landlord.30 The Partnership then subleased this property for
$50,000 per month to a Toyota car dealership in which Michael
was the sole stockholder (the "Lease").31 In 2004, Michael asked
the Partnership to subordinate the Lease to a construction loan
that Michael wanted to obtain in order to perform extensive im-
provements and expansions to the dealership.32 These expansions
were expected to significantly increase the dealership's sales.3
The Partnership refused Michael's request.34 Around the same
27. See id. § 50-73.62 to 50-73.63 (Repl. Vol. 2009).
28. Jennings v. Kay Jennings Family Ltd. P'ship, 275 Va. 594, 598-99, 659 S.E.2d
283, 285-86 (2008). Another Jennings sibling, Mary, also previously held interest in the
Partnership, but sold her interest to Michael in 2004. Id. at 598, 659 S.E.2d at 286.
29. Id. at 598, 659 S.E.2d at 285.
30. Id. at 599, 659 S.E.2d at 286.
31. Id. at 598, 659 S.E.2d at 286.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
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time, Louis allegedly made various statements to the dealership's
Toyota franchisor that the Lease was invalid.35
In response, Michael filed a derivative suit against the Part-
nership and Louis, alleging that Louis' actions breached his fidu-
ciary duties to the Partnership, increased the likelihood of harm
to the Partnership, and potentially subjected the Partnership to
Louis' creditors.36 The derivative suit also claimed that Louis in-
tentionally interfered with the dealership's business relationship
with Toyota.37 Michael asked for Louis to be expelled from the
Partnership and for Michael to be substituted as a general part-
ner in Louis' stead. 8
The Partnership filed a plea in bar and motion to dismiss the
derivative action, primarily asserting that Michael lacked stand-
ing to bring a derivative claim against the Partnership because
he did not "fairly and adequately represent the interests" of the
limited partners and Partnership as mandated by Virginia Code
section 50-73.62.19 The Partnership claimed that Michael pos-
sessed economic interests directly adverse to the Partnership and
was pursuing remedies not supported by the other partners or the
Partnership. 40 The trial court agreed with the Partnership and
dismissed Michael's claim for lack of standing.41
The supreme court affirmed the trial court's decision,42 and in
doing so, followed the trial court in considering the decision of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in Davis v.
Comed, Inc.41 In determining the standard for establishing the
standing requirement of fair and adequate representation in de-
rivative suits, the Davis court stated:
[A] court should examine any indications that there are extrinsic fac-
tors which render it likely that the representative may disregard the
interest of the class of members. Indeed, while a plaintiff is not nec-
essarily disabled to bring suit simply because some of his interests
35. Id. at 599, 659 S.E.2d at 286.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 600, 659 S.E.2d at 287.
40. See id.
41. See id.
42. Id. at 606, 659 S.E.2d at 290.
43. Id. at 601-02, 659 S.E.2d at 287-88 (citing Davis v. Corned, Inc., 619 F.2d 588,
593-94 (6th Cir. 1980)).
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extend beyond that of the class, the court may take into account out-
side entanglements that render it likely that the representatives may
disregard the interest of other class members.'
The Davis court elaborated that this standard must be analyzed
by considering (1) the economic antagonism between the plaintiff
limited partner and other limited partners, (2) the plaintiffs
enumerated remedy, (3) whether the plaintiff is the driving force
behind the litigation, (4) the familiarity of plaintiff with the liti-
gation, (5) other existing litigation between the parties, (6) the
magnitude of the plaintiffs personal interest compared with his
interest in the derivative claims, (7) any vindictiveness between
the parties, and (8) any support or approval obtained from other
limited partners.45
The supreme court agreed that these factors were relevant for
making the "fairly and adequately representing" determination,
but the court indicated that the totality of the circumstances
must also be evaluated.46 In concluding that Michael Jennings did
not "fairly and adequately" represent the interests of the Partner-
ship for purposes of bringing a derivative action, the trial court
and supreme court focused primarily on the economic antagon-
isms between Michael and the other partners and Partnership.4"
While the supreme court referred to the fact that the other part-
ners did not support Michael's derivative action, it did not ad-
dress any of the other Davis factors in significant detail.48
The supreme court identified several examples of Michael's
economic antagonism towards the Partnership that, ultimately,
precluded him from bringing a derivative suit. First, as a princip-
al of DAMN, LLC-the owner of the Property-Michael had an
adverse economic interest in securing as much rental income
from the Partnership as possible.49 Second, as the subtenant to
the Lease, he had the adverse economic interest of paying the
Partnership as little rent on the Lease as possible.50 Third, Mi-
chael had a personal interest in expanding the dealership by sub-
44. Davis, 619 F.2d at 593 (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
45. Id. at 593-94.
46. Jennings, 275 Va. at 602, 659 S.E.2d at 288.
47. See id. at 603-04, 659 S.E.2d at 289.
48. See id. at 603-05, 659 S.E.2d at 289-90.
49. Id. at 603, 659 S.E.2d at 289.
50. Id.
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ordinating the Partnership's interest to his own construction
loan.51 Fourth, when offering to purchase his siblings' partnership
interest in the Partnership, Michael had expressed an interest in
"control[ling] the partnership and the land."5 2 Finally, on behalf of
DAMN, LLC, he had instigated and participated in arbitration
proceedings against the Partnership regarding a rent dispute. 53
Arguing that the "economic antagonism must exist between the
plaintiffs economic interest and the claims raised in the deriva-
tive action," Michael asserted that Louis' actions adversely im-
pacting the Partnership's income stream were not related to any
of Michael's alleged economically antagonistic actions.54 The su-
preme court disagreed, stating:
Economic interests that may not be directly antagonistic to the
claims made in the derivative suit may, nevertheless, have an im-
pact on the derivative plaintiffs ability to fairly and adequately
maintain the litigation in the best interests of the partnership and
the other limited partners. Accordingly, in applying the Davis fac-
tors, it is appropriate to consider economic interests that may influ-
ence the derivative plaintiffs judgment in the management of the lit-
igation .... 15
Thus, the supreme court dismissed Michael's position and held
that because Michael was generally economically antagonistic to
the Partnership, his economic interests should properly be consi-
dered a factor in precluding Michael from representing the inter-
ests of the limited partners or Partnership for purposes of bring-
ing the derivative action.56
Although the supreme court focused primarily on Michael's
economic antagonism, it also evaluated his relationship with the
other limited partners and the weight this had on the other fac-
tors the trial court was required to consider. 57 Michael did not
contest that the other limited partners did not support his action
against Louis or the Partnership but argued that lack of support
of the others, who were both limited and general partners, was
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 604, 659 S.E.2d at 289.
54. Id. at 602-03, 659 S.E.2d at 288.
55. Id. at 603, 659 S.E.2d at 289.
56. See id. at 603-04, 659 S.E.2d at 289.
57. See id. at 604-05, 659 S.E.2d at 289-90.
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the "very essence of a derivative claim."8 Michael asserted that
because he was statutorily required to show that the general
partners refused to bring the claim or would not bring it if asked,
the dissent of the few remaining limited partners was "not a pre-
clusion to the derivative claim, but a requirement."59 Although the
supreme court agreed with Michael that having only a few part-
ners within a limited partnership may be relevant in analyzing
proper representation under the Davis test and that it may not be
possible to obtain support and consent from the other partners
when there are only a few other limited partners involved, it de-
termined that this factor "does not overshadow all other factors." 6°
In light of all the circumstances involved-such as the level of
Michael's economic antagonism to the Partnership-the court
held that this one factor did not warrant a finding that Michael
"fairly and adequately represented" the interests of the limited
partners or the Partnership.6 1 Thus, the supreme court affirmed
that Michael lacked standing to bring a derivative claim on the
Partnership's behalf and dismissed his derivative claims against
Louis and the Partnership12 Moreover, the supreme court also de-
termined that Louis and the Partnership were entitled to attor-
ney's fees in defending against Michael's appeal pursuant to Vir-
ginia Code section 50-73.65 and remanded the matter to the trial
court for that purpose. 63
B. Impact on Limited Partners' Claims and Ability to Seek
Redress
The supreme court's ruling in Jennings presents certain hur-
dles for economically antagonistic limited partners who have al-
legedly suffered from the actions of the general partner(s) and
want to seek redress. For example, if the harm suffered by the
limited partner cannot be distinguished from the harm caused to
the partnership or other limited partners, the partner would be
required to bring a derivative claim-instead of a direct claim-
to recover the damages incurred by the partnership. However, if
58. Id.
59. Id. at 605, 659 S.E.2d at 290.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. See id. at 605-06, 659 S.E.2d at 290.
63. Id. at 606, 659 S.E.2d at 290; see VA. CODE ANN. § 50-73.65 (Repl. Vol. 2009).
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the limited partner plaintiff is economically antagonistic to the
partnership, he could be precluded from bringing a derivative ac-
tion on behalf of the partnership because, based on Jennings, he
may not fairly and adequately represent the interests of the part-
nership or other limited partners.6 Accordingly, depending on the
circumstances and harm involved, that limited partner could be
prevented from bringing any claim to recover for damage incurred
either directly or derivatively.
Additionally, the limited partner is likely to possess the charac-
teristics that make him economically antagonistic prior to the ri-
pening of any claim against the general partner(s), and once
these characteristics exist, they likely cannot be changed. Fur-
thermore, because Jennings requires each limited partner plain-
tiff to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis to determine if he fair-
ly and adequately represents the interest of the partnership, 65 it
may be difficult to specifically ascertain what level of potential or
actual economic adversity or other relevant factor would preclude
pursuit of the derivative claim. Must the antagonism be as perva-
sive as the supreme court determined Michael Jennings to be, or
could it be as minor as having personal economic incentive to re-
ceive a distribution instead of having such distribution reinvested
into the partnership as a whole? Although the latter likely would
not in and of itself amount to economic antagonism sufficient to
preclude the bringing of a derivative action, in light of Jennings'
assertion that all relevant circumstances be considered, there is
no bright-line test or definition that automatically "protects" the
limited partner in this kind of a situation. What about the other
Davis factors or other non-enumerated factors not specifically
analyzed or discussed in detail in Jennings? Again, as Jennings
does not establish a bright-line test for analyzing these factors,
there is a significant level of ambiguity and factual variation as to
when a limited partner can and cannot bring a derivative claim
on behalf of a partnership.
As a result, if a general partner perceives that the power of a
limited partner to bring either a direct or derivative claim is re-
stricted or entirely precluded-especially if any other limited
partners are aligned with the general partner---Jennings may
have the indirect effect of promoting the "designing schemes and
64. See id. at 601, 659 S.E.2d at 287.
65. See id. at 602, 659 S.E.2d at 288.
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wiles of insiders who are willing to betray their company's inter-
ests in order to enrich themselves." 6 This result is directly con-
trary to the intent and purpose of derivative suits." Thus, a li-
mited partner who is precluded from pursuing a derivative claim
under Jennings may end up "stuck" in a limited partnership that
continues to suffer harm at the hands of the general partner(s)
with little or no ability to seek a judicial remedy for such harm.
IV. So WHAT CAN A POTENTIALLY "JENNINGS-PRECLUDED"
LIMITED PARTNER Do?
A. Responsibility of Practitioner Representing Limited Partners
Based on Jennings, the attorney representing a limited partner
contemplating an action against the general partner(s) in a li-
mited partnership must not only determine whether the client's
claims are direct or derivative in nature, but also whether, in
light of the Davis/Jennings factors, the client "fairly and ade-
quately represents" the interests of the partnership or other li-
mited partners.6 8 Prior to filing any complaint, the attorney must
carefully review the entire scope of the Jennings factors with the
client to determine what risks, if any, exist that would cause a
derivative claim to be dismissed for failure to fairly and adequate-
ly represent the interests of the other limited partners or the
partnership. Although clearly the economic antagonism factor
primarily relied upon in Jennings must be examined, all other
enumerated and non-enumerated potentially relevant factors
must also be discussed and considered. If such risks are identi-
fied, the attorney must counsel the client on the ramifications
and consider if there are other potential remedies to address the
situation. If there is a likelihood that the client could be consi-
dered economically antagonistic or otherwise fail the scrutiny of
66. Simmons v. Miller, 261 Va. 561, 573, 544 S.E.2d 666, 674 (2001) (quoting Surowitz
v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 383 U.S. 363,371 (1966)).
67. See id. (noting that derivative suits are meant to protect shareholders and part-
ners from insiders' schemes).
68. Although Jennings involved only a limited partnership, there is a chance that
these factors could be used to determine when a shareholder in a Virginia corporation or
member in a Virginia limited liability company also has standing to bring a derivative ac-
tion, as the language "fairly and adequately represents" is included in the Virginia Stock
Corporation Act as well as the Virginia Limited Liability Company Act for defining when a
shareholder or member may bring such an action. See VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-672.1(A)(4)
(Cum. Supp. 2009); id. § 13.1-1042 (Repl. Vol. 2006 & Cum. Supp. 2009).
[Vol. 44:167
PARTNERSHIP DERIVATIVE SUITS
the Jennings factors, the client must be informed of the possibili-
ty of dismissal as well as the potential that the attorney's fees in-
curred by the general partner(s) in defending against such action
could be assessed to the client.69 There should then be an open
discussion between the attorney and client about how to proceed
and the risks and benefits of doing so.
B. Potential Remedies
There are several remedies available to a limited partner plain-
tiff pursuing a derivative action. Depending on the specific situa-
tion, there may be other options or remedies to consider, but the
ones identified herein likely have the broadest application. °
1. Bring the Derivative Claim, Focusing on Why the Limited
Partner Does Fairly and Adequately Represent the Limited
Partnership.
It very well may be that, upon discussing and analyzing the
factors in Jennings, the attorney and client feel comfortable that
the client fairly and adequately represents the interests of the
partnership or other limited partners. Maybe the limited partner
is not truly economically antagonistic to the partnership. Per-
haps, even if the limited partner is economically antagonistic,
other relevant factors under the Jennings test would still allow
the limited partner to proceed with the claim. For example, con-
sider the situation in which there is only one limited partner and
only one general partner in the limited partnership. A court could
determine that the limited partner-the only potential plaintiff in
a derivative setting-is the only person who could prevent egre-
gious harm to the partnership. As such, the court could determine
that the potential ongoing harm to the partnership outweighs the
economic antagonism of the plaintiff and rule that the limited
partner fairly and adequately represents the interests of the
partnership. Further, the limited partner plaintiff, even if eco-
69. See Jennings, 275 Va. at 606, 659 S.E.2d at 290 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 50-
73.65 (Repl. Vol. 2009)).
70. As each situation is factually distinct, this article does not, nor cannot, identify
and/or discuss in detail every potential remedy or option that may exist or be appropriate
for a given client. Accordingly, this article only highlights and summarily discusses certain
options that may be available given the rulings in Jennings.
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nomically antagonistic to the partnership or general partner(s),
may have the support of other limited partners to pursue the de-
rivative claim. However, because there is no bright-line test to de-
termine who "fairly and adequately" represents the interests of
the limited partners or partnership, all the facts and issues must
be considered to evaluate whether the limited partner's derivative
claim will pass muster.
2. Re-Analyze the Ability to Bring a Direct Cause of Action
Although the attorney and limited partner plaintiff may have
initially dismissed the possibility of bringing a direct claim, they
may wish to reevaluate whether a distinguishable harm to the
limited partner can be established or if there are other non-
derivative claims that can be brought. A direct claim may be
proper when the limited partner can show that the general part-
ner breached an individual fiduciary duty to the limited partner
that has caused a harm distinguishable from any harm caused to
the partnership or the other limited partners. For example, the
limited partner may be able to bring a direct breach of fiduciary
duty claim against a general partner who intentionally fails to
make proper distributions to that limited partner despite the fact
that the general partner has provided proper distributions to the
other limited partners. In this situation, the limited partner ap-
pears to be injured in a way that the other limited partners and
partnership have not, and, thus, the harm to the individual li-
mited partner is unique and arguably distinguishable. Although
the supreme court has held that, under Virginia law, directors of
a corporation and managing members of a limited liability com-
pany do not owe a fiduciary duty to individual shareholders or
members, a general partner does owe a fiduciary duty to individ-
ual limited partners and other general partners in a limited part-
nership. 71
71. See Remora Invs., L.L.C. v. Orr, 277 Va. 316, 322, 673 S.E.2d 845, 847 (2009) (con-
trasting fiduciary duties under Virginia's general partnership law to corporate and limited
liability company law). Virginia's law on general partnerships provides that "a partner
owes to the partnership and the other partners... the duty of loyalty and the duty of care
... ." VA. CODE ANN. § 50-73.102(A) (Repl. Vol. 2009). The Virginia Limited Partnership
Act contains similar requirements of general partners unless the limited partnership
agreement states otherwise. Id. § 50-73.29(B) (Repl. Vol. 2009) ("Except as provided in this
chapter or in the partnership agreement, a general partner of a limited partnership has
the liabilities of a partner in a partnership without limited partners to the partnership
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Under similar theories, a direct claim may be the proper reme-
dy when the general partner has breached the partnership
agreement in a way that caused distinguishable harm to the li-
mited partner. Likewise, if the general partner made misrepre-
sentations to the limited partner for purposes of inducing that li-
mited partner to invest in the limited partnership and the limited
partner ultimately relied on these misrepresentations to his de-
triment, then a direct claim for fraud in the inducement may be
available. After fully discussing the Jennings factors and the po-
tential preclusion of a derivative claim, other facts may surface
that lead the attorney and limited partner plaintiff to determine
that a direct claim may truly be appropriate.
3. Consult Other Limited Partners
If the potential limited partner plaintiff and counsel evaluate
the Jennings factors and conclude that the derivative claim could
be dismissed for the plaintiffs failure to fairly and adequately
represent the interests of the other limited partners or partner-
ship, the limited partner may want to consult the other limited
partners to determine whether they would support his derivative
claim. If the limited partner believes that even with other limited
partners' support he would still be precluded from bringing the
derivative claim, he might inquire as to the other limited part-
ners' interest in pursuing the claim. Although such conversations
should be carefully undertaken so as not to amount to potential
conspiracy, consulting with the other limited partners to deter-
mine their level of support appears to be crucial for meeting the
Jennings test.72 Accordingly, in addition to being a practical con-
sideration, it is likely that any limited partner who pursues a de-
rivative action would need to describe in his initial pleading the
level of support received from other limited partners in order to
establish that he met the "fairly and adequately representing"
standard.
4. Withdrawal from or Dissolution of the Limited Partnership
If the limited partner ultimately determines that his claim
would have to be brought derivatively, he would likely be pre-
and to the other partners.").
72. See Jennings, 275 Va. at 604-05, 659 S.E.2d at 289-90.
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cluded from bringing such a derivative action for failing to fairly
and adequately represent the partnership, and other limited
partners are unwilling to bring the action on behalf of the limited
partnership, the limited partner may then look for a way to exit
the limited partnership in order to limit any harm. The limited
partner could do this in two ways: either attempt to disassociate
and withdraw from the limited partnership 73 or attempt to seek
dissolution of the limited partnership.
In order to withdraw from the limited partnership, the limited
partner must review and consult the limited partnership agree-
ment and determine what requirements must be met before
withdrawal is allowed.7 5 In order to seek judicial dissolution of the
limited partnership, a limited partner may petition the circuit
court to dissolve the limited partnership upon a finding that "it is
not reasonably practicable to carry on the business in conformity
with the partnership agreement."76 However, depending on the
factual situation, the court could determine that dissolution is not
appropriate because the limited partnership could reasonably
carry on pursuant to the partnership agreement despite the al-
leged wrongdoing of the general partner(s).7 7 Further, as there are
significant tax and other financial considerations that result from
withdrawal from or dissolution of a partnership, it is crucial for
the limited partner attempting to pursue these remedies to seek
appropriate counsel and advice to evaluate the overall ramifica-
tions of such actions.
5. Proactive Considerations
Given the Jennings ruling, there are several matters a poten-
tial limited partner should consider in addition to the business,
financial, and legal issues that are normally considered prior to
73. See VA. CODE ANN. § 50-73.38 (Repl. Vol. 2009) (setting forth the circumstances in
which a limited partner may withdraw from a limited partnership).
74. See id. § 50-73.50 (Repl. Vol. 2009) (setting forth the requirements for a judicial
dissolution of a limited partnership).
75. Id. § 50-73.38 (Repl. Vol. 2009).
76. Id. § 50-73.50 (Repl. Vol. 2009).
77. See, e.g., Dunbar Group, LLC v. Tignor, 267 Va. 361, 367-68, 593 S.E.2d 216, 219
(2004) (finding that even upon the expulsion of a member of a limited liability company
("LLC"), the business was still viable and thus the court could not dissolve the LLC). Al-
though this case involved a LLC and not a limited partnership, it is likely that the dicta in
Dunbar would be instructive to a court being asked to consider dissolution of a limited
partnership.
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entering into or joining a limited partnership. First, the potential
limited partner should consider that should a dispute arise re-
garding the actions of the general partner(s), the potential limited
partner's business ventures or other characteristics could prec-
lude him from bringing a derivative action on behalf of the part-
nership. If the potential limited partner would be precluded from
bringing a derivative suit, the potential limited partner should
consider whether the benefits of joining the limited partnership
outweigh the risk of claim preclusion and seek advice from coun-
sel regarding whether there is a way to structure the potential
limited partner's ownership interest in a way that would not prec-
lude the ability to bring a derivative action.
Second, the potential limited partner may be able to negotiate
with the general partner(s) to include terms in the partnership
agreement that allow for the limited partner to withdraw based
on parameters deemed crucial to the potential limited partner.
Finally, the potential limited partner should review the partner-
ship agreement to ensure that nothing in it precludes the limited
partner from bringing an individual claim for breach of fiduciary
duty. Although potential limited partners likely do not have
strong leverage to negotiate partnership agreement terms that
have already been predetermined by the general partner(s), if the
general and limited partners are on "equal footing" or are at the
nascent stages of negotiating and structuring such an agreement,
it may be possible to include terms favorable to the limited part-
ner.
V. CONCLUSION
Jennings presents almost as many questions as it intended to
resolve by holding that a limited partner must "fairly and ade-
quately" represent the interests of a partnership or other limited
partners when bringing a derivative action. Although ambiguity
exists, Jennings does provide guidance for the limited partner
plaintiff and his attorney in evaluating potential claims and re-
medies for perceived and actual harms. Accordingly, all the is-
sues, facts, circumstances, relationships involved in the limited
partnership, and potential claims should be thoroughly reviewed,
discussed, and analyzed prior to filing any claim.
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